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Abstract 
 
Improved understanding of the factors that influence malaria care seeking behaviour is 
necessary in order to enhance the effectiveness of current malaria control strategies. This 
paper empirically examines the factors that affect household choice of malaria treatment 
options in Ghana. The treatment options considered were choice of a public provider of 
health care, a private provider, purchase of drugs from a drug store, or self-medication. 
The results indicate that treatment and time costs are significant factors affecting the 
choice of health care provider. Education and household size also play an important role 
in malaria care seeking behaviour. The demand for malaria care is inelastic with respect 
to costs, and the magnitudes of the elasticities suggest that malaria care is a necessity. 
The policy implications are addressed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), malaria is the world's most 
important parasitic disease, and it kills more people than any other communicable disease 
except tuberculosis. The disease is endemic in 100 countries and about 2 billion people 
(about 40% of the world’s population) are at risk [1]. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the 
most affected region where it is estimated that between 0.5 and 2 million people die 
annually from the disease [2]. Malaria is caused by a protozoan parasite belonging to the 
genus Plasmodium and is transmitted through the bite of the Anopheline mosquito. Apart 
from the fact that malaria can be fatal, especially in children, it is a physically debilitating 
that imposes a high economic cost on the population. For example, the total treatment 
cost for an episode of malaria in the Kabale district in Uganda averaged around US$9 for 
adults and US$4 for children [3]. Monthly per capita household expenditures on malaria-
related preventive methods ranged between US$0.65 in rural Ghana to US$3.88 in urban 
Cameroon [4, 5].  
Ettling et al. [6] found that the total annual cost of malaria to low income households 
in Malawi was US$24.89, which is equivalent to 32% of household income. Leighton and 
Foster [7] estimated that total household costs amounted to 9-18% of annual income for 
small farmers in Kenya, and 7-13% in Nigeria. They estimated the total annual value of 
malaria-related production losses to be 2-6% of GDP in Kenya and 1-5% in Nigeria. 
Shepard et al. [8] estimated the overall economic cost of malaria morbidity and mortality 
in SSA to be US$3.15 per capita, equivalent to 0.6% of SSA’s GDP in 1999 prices. 
Finally, Gallup and Sachs [9] found that a 10% reduction malaria was associated with 
0.3% higher economic growth per annum. Given that many households in SSA live on 
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less than US$1, the estimated amounts for malaria treatment represent a substantial 
proportion of their income. 
Efforts to control the disease have included development of antimalarial drugs and an 
effective vaccine. Current malaria control measures include promoting the use of 
insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs) or non-treated bednets, screening of residential 
dwellings, use of mosquito repellents, improving drainage systems, and clearing of 
surroundings. Vaccination is perceived as one of the best options for malaria control. 
However, pending the development of an effective malaria vaccine it is important for 
individuals and countries to take measures to minimize the economic and physically 
debilitating effects of the disease. The Roll Back Malaria (RBM) campaign led by WHO 
is the current international strategy to control malaria and the aim is to cut down to 50% 
the current burden of malaria by 2010 [10].  Unlike previous attempts to eradicate 
malaria RBM emphasizes efficacious and cost-effective control strategies and promotes 
the use of local capacities and health systems. 
The aim of this paper is to empirically examine the factors that affect household 
choice of malaria treatment options in Ghana. Understanding the factors that influence 
malaria treatment seeking behaviour is necessary in order to improve malaria control, in 
particular, and health care, in general. For example, a better understanding of local 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviour towards malaria would assist policy makers to 
design appropriate public awareness programs. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 discusses the alternative malaria treatments and the factors affecting 
choice of treatment option, including results of empirical work in this field. Section 3 
describes the methodology, including the survey design and the empirical model. This is 
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followed by a discussion of the results. The final section contains the conclusions and 
policy implications. 
 
2. Alternative malaria treatments and factors affecting choice of treatment option 
In Ghana the alternative treatments for malaria can be grouped into the following broad 
categories: home remedies (referred to as self-medication or self-care in this paper), 
traditional medicine, consultation at drug stores, and formal (western) malaria care. 
Formal malaria care can be obtained from trained health professionals either at private or 
public clinics and hospitals. Home remedies and traditional medicines are examples of the 
alternative indigenous approaches to treating malaria. Home remedies include the use of 
local herbs for preparing concoctions that are ingested, smeared on the body or used in 
some other way with the aim to treat suspected malaria. A modern form of home remedy 
is the use of self-prescribed therapeutic drugs or left over prescription drugs. 
Antimalarials such as chloroquine can be purchased over the counter from 
pharmaceutical shops (referred to as ‘drug stores’) or from street vendors. Usually people 
buy whatever they can afford and not necessarily the correct dosage for effective 
treatment of an episode. Traditional medicine involves the purchase and use of medicinal 
preparations (prepared from local plant or animal material but may include manufactured 
pharmaceuticals) from traditional healers or ‘spiritual’ healers.  
Health care seeking behaviour in many SSA countries can be a complex process 
influenced by cultural beliefs, socioeconomic and other factors. Knowledge about 
households’ or caregivers’ correct recognition of malaria signs and symptoms, as well as 
the factors that affect their treatment seeking behaviour, are crucial for the success of the 
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current control efforts. Recent studies indicate that caregivers from Ghana and Kenya 
tend to be well-informed about the major symptoms of malaria [11-13] compared to their 
counterparts in Tanzania [14]. Knowledge and treatment seeking behaviours in areas 
where malaria transmission is infrequent but can occur at epidemic proportions may be 
different from that existing in areas with seasonal or perennial transmission of malaria 
[3]. However, even in places where people have a good knowledge of symptoms and 
cause of the disease, there is evidence that individual and structural barriers prevent 
people from seeking prompt and effective treatment. The large number of deaths 
resulting from malaria has been attributed to delays in seeking appropriate care [15-17]. 
Studies conducted in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania indicate that a significant proportion of 
caregivers perceive uncomplicated malaria to be a mild disease. However, they associate 
severe or cerebral malaria with evil spirits [12, 13, 18, 19]. In such cases, spiritual healers 
are usually approached for healing.  
 Other factors that affect malaria care-seeking behaviour include monetary factors 
(treatment costs, including user fees, and household income) [5, 20-22], nonmnonetary 
factors (e.g. travel time) [21, 23], access to a health care facility [24], quality of care [25], 
and epidemiological factors such as the prevalence of different malaria species and 
immunity levels. Evidence from Malawi [3] indicates that expenditure on malaria 
treatment can be highly regressive, consuming a much higher proportion of income in the 
poorest households. For example, the direct costs of treatment amounted to 28% of 
household income amongst low-income households and 2% amongst the rest. Mwabu et 
al. [25] found that increase in household income shifts demand from the informal health 
care sector to the modern sector, with much of this demand ending up in private and 
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mission-run clinics. Health care demand decreases with user fees and with greater 
distance to a health care facility, but increases with income. Following Acton’s [23] 
ground breaking work demonstrating the important role that time plays in the rationing of 
medicals services, several studies [5, 20, 21, 25-28] have reported the significant effect of 
time price on the demand for medical services. 
Unlike previous developing country studies that consider general outpatient demand 
[21, 25-27, 29-31], this study considers a single disease – malaria. The study also differs 
from previous studies on malaria care demand [5, 24, 32] by comparing the behavior of 
rural and urban communities where the full range of treatment options are available. 
Bonilla and Rodriquez [32] examined time-losses and labour reallocations within 
households in rural Columbia in order to shed light on the economic consequences of 
malaria. De Bartolome and Vosti [24] carried out a case study of malaria treatment in a 
Brazilian colonization project. However, that study considered only binary treatment 
options namely, private or public clinics, thus precluding self-care and treatment from 
other sources. Unlike the Brazilian situation, self-care for malaria treatment is common in 
Ghana as well as in other developing countries. Asenso-Okyere et al. [5] focused 
exclusively on malaria care demand in rural areas where there is limited choice of health 
care facilities. Thus, the determinants of malaria care services in communities with 
formal and informal health care facilities have not been adequately investigated. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Survey design 
The data for this study were obtained in face-to-face interviews conducted in Ghana 
between July and November 1997. Two communities, Amasaman in the Greater Accra 
region and Hohoe in the Volta region, were selected for the study. Amasaman has a 
population of about 80,000 while Hohoe has a population of about 143,670. Ghana’s 
population in 1997 was estimated at 17 million, the majority (about 70%) of which lives 
in rural areas and is predominantly engaged in agriculture. The Volta and the Greater 
Accra regions of Ghana were selected in order to compare malaria care demand in two 
contrasting regions. The Greater Accra region is predominantly urban and has relatively 
low levels of poverty, while the Volta region is mainly rural and has higher levels of 
poverty [33]. 
Four focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in each community to explore 
the people’s views about the main causes, local terms, symptoms and signs and 
treatments of malaria and other common diseases. Participants in the FGDs included 
parents/caregivers of children under 10 years in small groups of eight to twelve people. 
Key informant interviews of community health workers, and community elders were also 
conducted to further explore local knowledge of malaria. The results of the FGDs and 
key informant interviews were then used to develop a semi-structured questionnaire 
which was pre-tested prior to the final survey on household malaria treatment seeking 
behaviour.  
The sampling frame for the survey consisted of all households in the two selected 
communities. The cluster sampling technique was employed to select the household 
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sample. Landmarks such as roads and other prominent features were used to divide the 
community into clusters which were assigned numbers. The numbers were randomly 
drawn from a box and all households within a selected cluster were interviewed. For 
purposes of the study, a household was defined as a group of people who live under the 
same "roof" and partake of communally prepared food for a period of three months 
preceding the interview. 
All malaria cases (involving children and adults) identified in the selected households 
within the four weeks preceding the date of interview were considered in the survey.  
Personal rosters were generated for each household member documenting their 
demographic profiles, level of education attained and the period they had lived in the 
community. Morbidity search data were collected for each identified case including the 
following: (i) signs and symptoms used to identify the reported malaria case; (ii) all 
treatment activities undertaken; (ii) the principal advisor(s) for each treatment activity; 
(iii) costs incurred while seeking each type of treatment; (iv) number of days that elapsed 
before treatment was initiated; and (v) how long it took before the patient was cured or a 
particular treatment option was declared a failure. Information on household income was 
collected using the expenditure method.  Household incomes are difficult to estimate in 
developing countries and the expenditure method has been found to be a more reliable 
approach [33].  Mothers/caregivers were the principal respondents to the survey 
questions. However, the entire household including patients who could communicate 
participated in the survey, answering specific questions relating to them. The principal 
breadwinners (e.g. mother, father or grandparent), for example, were invited to answer 
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questions relating to expenses incurred in treating the identified cases and/or household 
income. 
In total, 228 households (1448 individuals) were sampled in the two selected 
communities. However, after adjusting for incomplete information the final sample size 
came to 182 households. It is important to note that although the unit of analysis is the 
household, it is the malaria cases that were used in the empirical model as observations. 
Since some households reported more than one malaria case, a sample of size of 231 
observations (or malaria cases) were used to model malaria care seeking behaviour. Table 
1 shows the mean values of the main socioeconomic characteristics of the sample.  
[Table 1] 
Average annual household income (represented by annual expenditure) was ¢4.61 million 
(US$2,105). Approximately a quarter of the respondents were males, and average 
household size was 4.3. In order to ascertain how representative our sample was of the 
general population, we compared some of the sample characteristics with equivalent 
measures in the 1999 Ghana Living Standards Survey [34]. The results (see Table 1) 
indicate a close correspondence for household size and household income. 
Since early diagnosis and treatment is one of the formal malaria control measures 
adopted in Africa, the analysis in this study focuses on the choice of the first provider 
visited in the reference period. One advantage of using the first provider visit is that the 
dependent variables (i.e., the treatment options) are mutually exclusive and therefore logit 
analysis could be used. The survey instrument was therefore designed to seek information 
for the first treatment action and the interviewers were trained to probe the responses on 
the initial treatment attempts made by households.1 
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3.2 Model specification 
It is assumed that households (or individuals) derive utility (U) on the basis of their 
health status (Hj) acquired from consuming health care and other goods. Suppose that the 
health of the infected individual depends on the type of treatment he/she receives (Z) and 
the severity of the attack (S). In addition, the individual’s health depends on his/her innate 
resistance to malaria, which in turn, depends on the individual’s demographic 
characteristics (W). The household’s health function can therefore be written as  
 Hj = Hj(Z, W) (1)  
Severity of attack is a scalar variable with a threshold value of S* and increasing 
severity is associated with a worsening health condition. It is assumed that households 
choose to treat malaria if severity exceeds the threshold value (i.e., S* ≤ S).2  Z is an 
indicator variable where Z=1 if the individual receives treatment from an external health 
care provider (public clinic, private clinic, or drug store) and Z=0 if the individual opts 
for self care. The choice of self-care is assigned a value of zero and is used as the 
normalised treatment option since this alternative is available to all households. Households 
are assumed to choose a particular external health care provider if they perceive the 
services of that provider to be of a higher quality compared to self-care and other 
alternative providers. The household budget constraint can be expressed as 
 Y = (Pj + vTj)Hj + (Pn + vTn)Qn                                                                 (2) 
where Pj is the user fee charged by provider j per malaria episode; Pn is the price of self-
care; v is the individual’s opportunity cost of time; and T is the time spent traveling to the 
provider and waiting for care. The total price of obtaining malaria care from provider j can 
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be written as Cj = (Pj +  vTj). Setting the price of the numeraire good, (Pn+ vTn), to unity, 
the budget constraint can be written as  
  Qn = Y - CjHj                       (3)  
Considering the choice of an external health care provider and self-care, respectively, the 
budget constraint in (3) can be re-specified as  
 Qn = Y - Cj              for j∈ J, and j ≠ 0      (4a)                                 
 Qn = Y                     for j = 0    (4b)                                 
Where J is the total number of health care providers. The household’s indirect utility 
function can be expressed in terms of its health status and budget constraint as follows: 
 U = U(Hj(Z, W), Y - Cj)                                                                             (5)  
It is assumed that Equation (5) is a well-behaved utility function that depends on 
exogenous health factors and prices.3 For a given state of nature, W, utility is assumed to 
increase with household income. Following Lavy and Quigley [28], it is assumed that there 
are no costs associated with self-care. That is, self-care is assigned a value of C(0,0), and 
the choice of an external care provider j is associated with specific time and money costs, 
which is assigned a value of C(i, j). For an individual whose severity of malaria depends on 
W, Uij represents the utility derived from C(i, j). The utility associated with a provider’s 
care is assumed to be stochastic and is written as  
 Uij = Vij + εij                                                                                 (6)                          
where the observable (deterministic) component of the utility function is   
 Vij = αij + β(Y - Cij) + γijW                  (7)                                   
and εij  is an additive error term. The observable component of the utility associated with 
the self-care alternative is  
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 Vi0 = αi0 + βY + γi0W  (8)                                   
The provider and self-care utility functions in a log-linear specification are represented,4 
respectively, as  
 Vij = αij + βln(Y – Cij) + γijW + eij                              (9)                                 
and  
 Vi0 = αi0 + βln(Y) + γi0W + ei0                             (10)                                
As is well-known in the discrete choice literature, the observed choice depends on the 
difference in utility and not on the levels of utility per se. Normalising on self-care yields 
 Vij – Vi0 = αij - αi0 + βln(1 – Cij/Y) + (γij - γi0)W + eij – ei0               (11)                 
  ≈ αij - αi0 - β(Cij/Y) + (γij - γi0)W + eij – ei0                     (12)                     
where Cij/Y is the proportion of income spent on malaria care and also represents price-
income interaction in the model. A reduced form model that allows utility to vary by 
alternative can therefore be specified as  
 Vj = β1j - β2j(Cj/Y) + γjW + εj   (13)   
The subscripts on the constant term in (13) show that the intercept varies by provider and 
therefore allows an observation of the difference in the household’s perceived quality for 
the different providers. 
 The number of health care provider alternatives, J, is classified into m = 2 groups 
(external care and self-care), with three alternatives (public, private, drug store) in the 
‘external care’ group. Assuming that the error terms associated with alternative health care 
providers are identically and independently distributed Weibull functions, the probability 
(Pij) of choosing a malaria care provider j∈ J in the ith group can be specified as   
 12
 ijJ
im
m=1
exp(V )
exp(V )
ijP = ∑
 (14) 
It is assumed that the health care providers form a set of mutually exclusive choices. Each 
sample household is a random and independent draw from the universe of households. 
Thus, the logarithm of the likelihood function, Li, for the observable sample of households, 
N, is given by 
 
N J
ij ij
i=1 j=1
ln D ln PiL =∑∑  (15) 
where Dij  is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value unity if the household chooses 
alternative j and zero otherwise.  
3.3 Variables and a priori expectations 
The dependent variable is the probability of choosing a malaria care provider, while the 
estimated coefficients of the variables indicate how changes in each of the independent 
variables affects household choice for malaria care provider relative to self-care. The 
signs on the coefficients show the direction of the odds of choosing an alternative 
provider instead of self-care. Based on economic theory and previous studies, we 
hypothesize that the choice of malaria care provider depends on household income, 
treatment costs, travel and waiting time, and other socio-economic variables (see Table 2). 
[Table 2] 
A priori, we expect a negative relationship between treatment, travel and time costs and 
the probability of choosing a malaria care provider. In addition to income, other 
demographic characteristics that could affect the household’s choice of malaria care 
service provider include age, education, gender, family size (numbers of adults and 
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children), severity of malaria, and number of healthy days. We use age and the number of 
healthy days as a proxy for health status. We hypothesize that older people are more likely 
to select self-care relative to external care due to their reduced spending power and we 
therefore expect a negative coefficient on age.  We also expect a negative sign on the 
coefficient of ‘healthy days’ because the longer individuals stay healthy the less likely they 
are to seek external care when sick. We hypothesize that a more educated household head 
(or decision maker) will be better able to follow prescribed treatment and therefore is likely 
to choose an external health care provider over self-care. Thus, the coefficient on age is 
expected to be positive. 
Regarding family size, we hypothesize that the greater the number of adults and the 
fewer the number of children, the more likely the household is to self-medicate. Therefore, 
we expect a positive coefficient on family size.  We expect that households are more likely 
to self-medicate if they believe the malaria symptoms are not severe. Therefore, we expect 
a negative sign on the coefficient of severity. We also included gender and pregnancy 
status as additional explanatory variables. We have no a priori expectations on the signs of 
these variables but we wanted to investigate whether they are important factors affecting 
malaria care seeking behaviour. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Knowledge and perceptions of malaria in the study communities 
Most of the respondents (93.7% and 96.2% in Amasaman and Hohoe, respectively) 
perceived malaria to be a major health problem. Because malaria is endemic in the study 
communities, almost all respondents in the samples had some knowledge about malaria. 
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About 43% of the respondents in Amasaman and 75.6% in Hohoe, however, believed that 
there are different types of malaria and most of them mentioned jaundice as the other 
type of malaria. This finding is consistent with the findings of Agyepong [11] that 
residents in the West Dangbe district of Ghana perceive malaria to be of two kinds: asra 
and asraku (local names for mild and severe malaria/fever). 
There is currently no established set of symptoms by which malaria can be identified 
apart from laboratory tests. However, the key informant survey revealed that there is a set 
of symptoms which households use to identify the disease. Furthermore, there is evidence 
of a correlation between traditional symptoms and laboratory confirmation of malaria. 
Agyepong [11] found that about 70% of those in the West Dangbe district in Ghana who 
thought they had malaria using traditional symptoms tested positive for the disease, while 
about 20% of those who thought they did not have malaria were also positive. Jackson 
[35] has also reported similar findings for Liberia. The correlation between traditional 
symptoms and actual confirmation seems to be quite high because most village health 
workers depend on the symptoms to identify the disease in the absence of laboratory 
facilities.  
Table 3 presents respondents’ rankings of the symptoms used by households in 
Amasaman and Hohoe to identify malaria. It can be seen that the three most important 
symptoms that households associate with malaria are headache, chills and high body 
temperature. It is important to note the possibility that some respondents may report fevers 
other than malaria, therefore the disease discussed for the sample may more appropriately be 
described to as “malaria/fever”. 
[Table 3] 
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4.2 Multinomial logit model estimation results 
The multinomial logit (MNL) model of malaria care provider choice was estimated by 
maximizing the log likelihood function (Equation 15) using the full information maximum 
likelihood procedure.5 The empirical results are reported in Table 4.  
[Table 4] 
It can be seen that treatment cost has the expected negative coefficient and is significant 
for both groups of respondents. This finding is consistent with the results of Asenso-
Okyere et al. [13], de Bartolome and Vosti [24], Gertler and van der Gaag [26], Lavy and 
Quigley [28], and Dzator [36], among others. Waiting time has the expected negative 
sign but is not statistically significant. This finding is surprising given that public health 
facilities in particular are characteristically associated with long waiting times. Travel 
time has a negative statistically significant effect on choice of provider for Amasaman 
residents but not for Hohoe residents, but is significant for the combined sample. This 
implies that households in Amasaman have a higher probability of reducing the 
utilisation of a provider’s service the longer it takes to travel to the facility in contrast to 
residents of Hohoe. This difference can be explained by the fact that residents in 
Amasaman (a predominantly urban community with a higher per capita income) have a 
higher opportunity cost of time than those of Hohoe (a rural community with a lower per 
capita income). 
Of the demographic variables, age has the hypothesised sign but does not 
significantly affect the choice of any of the three external care options relative to self-
care.  Regarding gender, it appears that females have a tendency to seek external care 
compared to males, although the significance of this relationship is only confirmed for 
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the Hohoe subsample where females have a higher probability of seeking treatment for 
malaria from a public health care provider compared to males. The more literate 
households tend to seek treatment from a private health care provider rather than self-
medicate, and they are also likely to choose a public health care provider over self-care. 
Households with more children are more likely to select a private health care provider 
over self-care, but are more likely to opt for self-care over a public health care provider. 
A possible explanation for this result could be that private health care providers operate 
for longer hours and are therefore more convenient for working families. Households 
with more adults are likely to purchase treatment from a drug store. 
Pregnancy status and severity do not appear to be significant factors affecting malaria 
care seeking behaviour. The variable ‘healthy days’ has a negative coefficient for the 
three providers as expected, but is significant for only private health care providers. This 
result is not a surprising since healthy people do not require medication, implying that 
malaria control measures are important in reducing the burden on health care facilities. 
Table 5 presents estimates of own-price demand elasticities of the significant price 
variables computed for the combined sample at the means of the independent variables.   
[Table 5] 
A 10% increase in treatment costs will reduce demand for malaria care by 2.1% at public 
health care providers and 0.4% at drug stores, while a 10% increase in travel time will 
reduce demand for malaria care by 3.6% from public health care providers and 1.3% from 
drug stores. These results indicate that demand for malaria care is generally inelastic with 
respect to time and treatment costs and is a necessary good. However, in terms of treatment 
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and time costs, demand is relatively more inelastic for drug stores compared to public 
health care providers and private health care providers in that order of magnitude.  
To test the plausibility of our results, we compared our elasticity estimates with various 
developing country health care demand studies (see Table 6).  
[Table 6] 
These studies consider general health care demand and are therefore not strictly 
comparable to ours. Nevertheless, they do provide a benchmark for the general order of 
magnitude of our elasticity estimates. Gertler and van der Gaag’s [26] nested multinomial 
logit (NMNL) estimates for own price elasticities for professional care in Cote d’Ivoire 
range from -0.12 to -2.82 for treatment costs and from -0.11 to -1.88 for time costs. Using 
various models including hedonic expenditure functions, Generalised Least Squares and 
NMNL, Lavy and Quigley [28] estimated own price elasticities of between -0.19 and -0.13 
for intensity of treatment and -0.18 and -1.82 for quality of treatment for health care 
demand in Ghana. Mwabu and Wang’ombe [38] estimated the own price elasticity of 
demand for outpatient visits in Kenya to be between -0.03 and -0.20.  Bouldoc et al. [39] 
obtained much higher estimates using probit (-1.16 to -4.26) and independent probit models 
(-1.52  to -5.65). However, their results using Ordinary Least Squares are within the range 
obtained in this study. It is expected that differences in estimates will arise between studies 
due to differences in the underlying assumptions of the various models and techniques, as 
well as the types of data collected. However, in general, we can conclude that our estimates 
lie within the range for health care demand elasticities in developing countries, lending 
some support for their robustness. 
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Like all economic models, our MNL model suffers from a number of limitations. 
First is the problem of omission bias. It is not possible that all the relevant variables 
affecting the choice of malaria care provider have been captured in the model. For 
example, in Ghana, an informal credit system referred to as susu is likely to play an 
important role in health care provider choice. Unfortunately, we were unable to include 
this variable in the model. However, the magnitude of the omission bias problem is 
unlikely to be large given that we have included important variables such as treatment 
costs, time costs, waiting time and key socioeconomic variables. The second more 
serious problem is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property to which the 
MNL model is susceptible. This refers to the assumption that the odds of a particular 
choice are unaffected by the presence of additional alternatives. We tested for the IIA 
property using Hausman and McFaddens’ test [40] and we found that in most cases the 
IIA property in the MNL models was not violated.6 
 
5.  Conclusions and policy implications 
The main findings of the study are that treatment and time costs have a significant 
negative effect on the choice of malaria care provider. Of the socioeconomic variables, 
education and household size play a significant role in malaria care seeking behavior. The 
more educated a household is, the more likely it is to seek treatment at a private health 
care provider compared to self-medication. Furthermore, households with more children 
are more likely to select a private health care provider over self-care, but are more likely 
to select self-care over a public provider. There was some weak support for gender as a 
factor in malaria care seeking behaviour. Females in Hohoe (a rural area) have a higher 
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probability of seeking care at a public provider. In general, the study results confirm the 
fact that demand for malaria care is inelastic with respect to costs, while the small 
magnitudes of the elasticities indicate that it is a necessity. 
The study results have a number of important implications for RBM, in general, and 
Ghana’s malaria control strategy, in particular. The majority of malaria cases identified in 
our sample were managed first at home with herbal preparations, left over drugs or over 
the counter drugs. This finding is consistent with previous studies in Ghana (11, 12, 41) 
and other parts of SSA (42-44) that establish polypharmacy as a common practice in the 
region. While the most desirable strategy is to encourage people to seek hospital-based 
treatment, the fact of the matter is that self-medication will remain a popular choice due 
to economic and/or structural factors such as lack of access to health care facilities. Thus, 
there is a need for programs to educate the public on the correct dosage of malaria tablets 
to take as a prophylactic and for treatment when sick. 
Operators of pharmaceutical shops (drug stores) are the first point of contact for 
households undertaking self-care. They are therefore an important link in efforts to 
control malaria. However, the majority of these personnel have little or no training in the 
provision of health services. Given that the use of local capacities and health systems is 
one of the cornerstones of the RBM campaign, we recommend that policy makers should 
focus on building the capacity of drug store operators, particularly in diagnostic and other 
relevant skills so as to promote the early diagnosis and treatment strategies adopted in 
Ghana. It would also be beneficial to the country to involve the operators in the design 
and delivery of local malaria prevention and treatment strategies. 
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The study’s findings confirm the well-known fact that monetary factors such as 
treatment cost and income are important variables affecting the choice of malaria 
treatment option. These issues should therefore be addressed in the current malaria 
control strategy. Apart from improving the availability and affordability of malarial 
drugs, we advocate increased promotion of preventive strategies such as the use of ITNs 
and chemoprophylasis. However, the problem with bednets is that they are generally not 
available in rural areas. In such areas, access is often restricted to those who can afford to 
buy them from urban centres. Recent initiatives such social marketing aim to improve 
access by providing nets at subsidised prices. However, it has been suggested that it may 
actually be more cost-effective to provide bednets for free through existing 
infrastructures such as antenatal clinics. Doing so could cost US$4 per ITN [45]. Even so, 
it is doubtful whether cash-strapped governments in malaria endemic countries can afford 
to cover these costs. There is therefore a need for financial support from initiatives such 
as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and individual donor 
countries. 
Many countries in SSA have moved to a user fee (or ‘cash and carry’) system in the 
public health sector. It is inevitable that prices will have to rise in order to achieve full cost 
recovery. Our results indicate that, in relative terms, increased fees will lead to a choice of 
self-care over external care. One way the government could encourage the use of health 
care facilities would be to promote a nation-wide national health insurance scheme. Such a 
scheme would encourage “pre-saving” towards treatment fees and would curtail self-
medication and delays in seeking care, thereby promoting early and efficacious treatment 
for malaria. A recent study found that the majority of Ghanaian households would be 
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willing to pay a monthly premium of approximately ¢2,500 (US$1.14) if such a scheme 
were implemented [46]. 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the growth of private facilities in Ghana as 
the public infrastructure has deteriorated due to lack of maintenance and capital investment. 
There is a need for the government to improve the regulation of private health facilities and 
drug pricing in order to protect the public's welfare and improve malaria treatment. There is 
also the need for more public education programs to discourage self-medication since the 
misuse of malarial drugs would promote the resistance of malaria parasites to the drugs. 
Also the education program is required to encourage early reporting of malaria symptoms 
before the disease becomes severe. 
To conclude, it is useful to draw a number of caveats. Problems inherent in the model 
were briefly discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, household surveys of this 
type are prone to respondent recall errors. Thus, although this study has generated some 
insights into malaria care seeking behaviour, caution must be exercised not to use the 
model to predict health care demand or to make resource allocation decisions. Future 
work could investigate the use of less restrictive models such as the multinomial probit 
and the independent multinomial probit models. 
 
Notes 
1. A copy of the survey instrument is available from the authors upon request. 
2. A threshold is relevant here because a household will take no action if it perceives the 
symptoms not to be severe. 
3. This assumption implies that the function is monotonic in its variables and is 
differentiable. 
4. Gertler and van der Gaag [26] show that such a function is consistent with well-
ordered preferences. 
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5. A nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model was also estimated but it did not perform 
better than the MNL. Also a specification test using the inclusive value indicated that 
the MNL model cannot be rejected in favour of the NMNL model. 
6. The Hausman and McFadden test involves estimating the MNL with all the choice 
options (unrestricted model) and a restricted subset of the full-set choice model 
(restricted model) and testing for the significance of the chi-square statistic. 
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Table 1 
Socioeconomic characteristics of the samplea 
 
 Household 
expend. p.a. 
(million 
cedis) 
 
 
Education 
(years) 
 
 
Age 
(years) 
 
No. of 
Males 
(%) 
 
 
Household 
size 
 
 
Sample 
size 
Community:       
Amasaman 6.06 9.7 32.9 19 (20) 4.3 96 
       
Hohoe 3.01 9.5 34.0 29 (34) 4.1 86 
       
Total 4.61 9.6 33.5 48 (26) 4.3 182 
       
1999 GLS Surveyb 4.24 - - - 4.3 5998 
 
Notes: 
a. Data refer to sample means unless otherwise stated. 
b. GLS Survey refers to Ghana Living Standards Survey. Source: Ghana Statistical Service [34]. 
 
Table 2 
Variable description 
 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
Dependent variable: 
Probability of choosing a 
malaria care provider 
 
Probability of choosing self-care versus external care which has  
three alternatives (public, private, drug store) 
  
Explanatory variables:  
Facility price: Total or lump sum payments made to seek care  
Waiting time: Opportunity cost of waiting time at facility 
Travel time: Opportunity cost of travel time 
Gender: Gender of patient (male=1, female=0) 
Age: Age of the patient in years 
Education: Years of formal schooling of the person who decided the type of 
treatment obtained 
Severity: Perceived severity of malaria (severe=1, mild=0) 
Pregnant: Pregnancy status of sick adult females (pregnant =1, otherwise 0) 
Adult: Number of adults (18 years and over) in the household 
Children: Number of children (<18 years) in the household 
Healthy days: Number of healthy days within 28 days from the day of interview 
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Table 3 
Ranking of malaria symptoms by residents in the study communities 
 
 
Symptom  
Order of ranking by 
Amasaman residents 
Order of ranking by 
 Hohoe residents 
1. Headache 1 2 
2. Chills 2 3 
3. High body temperature 3 1 
4. Vomiting 4 8 
5. Loss of appetite 5 5 
6. Bodily weakness 6 5 
7. Yellowish urine 7 6 
8. Bitter taste 8 4 
9. Vague feeling 9 15 
10. Dizziness 10 7 
11. Sleeplessness 11 9 
12. Pale looking 12 10 
13. Nausea 12 11 
14. Perspiration 13 12 
15. Yellowish palm 14 16 
16. Delirium (bad dream) 14 13 
17. Yellowish eye ball 15 14 
 
Source: survey data. 
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Table 4 
Multinomial logit model results 
 
  
Amasaman residents 
 
Hohoe residents 
 
 
Combined Sample 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Price variables       
Treatment cost/Incomea -0.23 1.64* -0.75 1.93** -0.20 1.99** 
Waiting time/Incomea -0.15 0.39 -0.19 1.00 -0.10 0.60 
Travel time/Incomea -10.35 1.95** -0.82 0.48 -4.92 1.99** 
       
Public provider       
Constant 3.68 1.47 5.14 2.03** 2.79 1.89** 
Age 0.09 0.39 -0.18 0.82 -0.11 0.79 
Gender (male=1, female=0) 1.07 1.51 -2.27 1.94** 0.17 0.36 
Education -1.30 1.73* 0.18 0.28 -0.46 1.08 
Severity (mild=1, severe=0) -0.46 0.70 -0.58 1.70 -0.56 1.23 
Pregnant (pregnant=1, 
otherwise=0) 
    0.07 0.05 
Child -0.30 1.20 -1.02 2.44*** -0.37 2.03** 
Adult 0.08 0.35 -0.40 1.17 -0.04 0.21 
Healthy days -0.98 1.31 -0.98 1.37 -0.69 1.58 
       
Private provider       
Constant 3.82 1.65* -0.88 0.39 0.98 1.72* 
Age -0.21 0.96 0.05 0.22 -0.17 1.26 
Gender (male=1, female=0) -0.16 0.25 -1.10 1.14 -0.02 0.00 
Education 1.08 1.63* 1.76 2.10** 0.94 2.28** 
Severity (mild=1, severe=0) -0.68 1.10 -0.15 1.68 -0.41 1.66* 
Pregnant (pregnant=1, 
otherwise=0) 
    1.52 1.07 
Child 0.49 2.19** -0.06 0.17 0.34 2.26** 
Adult 0.03 0.14 0.34 1.19 0.12 0.79 
Healthy days -1.97 2.81*** -1.37 2.34*** -1.21 3.21*** 
       
Drug store        
Constant -1.99 0.77 0.67 0.48 -0.22 0.19 
Age 0.08 0.39 -0.02 0.18 -0.05 0.48 
Gender (male=1,female=0) -0.22 0.39 0.50 1.02 0.19 0.54 
Education 0.35 0.60 0.50 1.21 0.48 1.52 
Severity (mild=1, severe=0) 0.72 1.36 0.14 0.30 0.35 1.07 
Pregnant (pregnant=1, 
otherwise=0) 
    1.48 1.24 
Child 0.23 1.17 -0.29 1.50 0.03 0.27 
Adult 0.03 0.17 0.43 2.57*** 0.20 1.72* 
Healthy days 0.37 0.45 -0.87 1.92** -0.37 1.01 
       
Log likelihood function -123.51 -111.35 -271.93 
R2 0.20 0.32 0.15 
Adjusted R2  0.13 0.26 0.11 
Sample size 112 119 231 
Note:   ***,  **,  * indicates significant at 1%. 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
a. Household per capita expenditure less the sum of all cash payments and the opportunity costs of 
care is used as a proxy for income. 
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Table 5 
Own price elasticity of demand estimatesa 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Treatment 
cost 
 
 
Travel time 
   
 Public provider -0.21 -0.36 
 Private provider -0.22 -0.33 
 Drug store -0.04 -0.13 
   
 
Note: 
a.  The elasticities were generated using LIMDEP (version 7) program (Greene, 36). 
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Table 6 
 Selected own price elasticity estimates from developing country studies 
 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Econometric 
model 
Dependent 
variable/ 
Provider/ 
Scope 
 
 
Own price 
elasticity 
 
 
 
Country 
 
-0.12  to -2.82 
 
 
 
Gertler and van der 
Gaag (1990) 
 
 
 
 
NMNL 
 
 
 
Health care 
service provider 
 
-0.11 to -1.88 
(own time-
price 
elasticity) 
 
 
Cote d’Ivoire 
 
 
Intensity of 
treatment 
 
 
-0.19 to -0.13 
 
 
 
Lavy and Quigley 
(1993) 
 
Hedonic 
expenditure 
function(continuous), 
GLS(continuous), 
NMNL 
Quality of 
treatment 
 
-0.18  to -1.81 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Mwabu and 
Wang’ombe 
(1994) 
 
OLS(continuous) 
 
Outpatient visits 
 
-0.03  to -0.20 
 
Kenya 
de Bartolome and 
Vosti (1995) 
 
MNL 
 
Private clinic 
 
-0.05  to -0.58 
 
Brazil 
 
Probit 
 
Health care 
provider  
 
-1.16  to -4.26 
 
 
Independent Probit 
 
Provider service 
 
-1.52  to -5.65 
 
Benin 
 
 
 
 
Bouldoc et al. 
(1996)  
OLS(discrete) 
 
Intensity of 
treatment 
 
-0.10 to -0.36 
(own time-
price 
elasticity) 
 
 
Notes 
MNL: Multinomial logit 
NMNL: Nested Multinomial logit 
GLS: Generalised Least Squares 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares 
 
